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For societies suffering in the wake of a repressive regime, truth commissions may be 
a necessary compromise regarding the form of transitional justice pursued, but they can 
still play a far-reaching role in the democratization of civil-military relations. Because 
the perpetrators of past abuses are likely to continue to wield some level of power 
at the time of transition, prosecution of these members may be politically infeasible. 
Lacking the mandate to prosecute guilty parties or implement recommendations, truth 
commissions can still lay the foundation for a new era of civil-military relations. By 
distinguishing contemporary institutions from their past acts, revealing the patterns that 
allowed abuses to be carried out , and helping garner the political will for reforms, truth 
commissions can provide the impetus for the security sector reforms necessary to ensure 
a democratic future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
By providing an offi cially sanctioned 
means of confronting a nation’s violent 
past, truth commissions can help 
societies move forward, out of the 
shadow of brutality and authoritarianism. 
One potential aim for truth commissions 
is bridging the gap in civil-military 
relations. By holding accountable 
those who perpetrated past abuses, 
truth commissions enable societies to 
distinguish reformed security forces 
from the institutions that carried out 
past abuses, helping restore society’s 
trust. Moreover, by bringing to light 
the structures that allowed past abuses 
to be carried out, the fi ndings of truth 
commissions can provide the impetus for 
institutional reforms. Even though truth 
commissions typically lack the mandate 
to enforce their recommendations, their 
fi ndings can help garner the political 
will to carry out reforms.  
Still, truth commissions are only one 
of many possibilities for dealing with 
past atrocities, and their limitations 
must be acknowledged. The pursuit 
of transitional justice can have the 
counter-productive effect of making 
persisting divisions in society more 
poignant.  Investigating past abuses 
is likely to be met with resistance by 
those responsible for these acts. If the 
potential of prosecution exacerbates 
the division in society between armed 
forces and the population at large, 
then the pursuit of justice can be an 
impediment to further democratization 
or can put up obstacles to creating an 
effective defense force. 
In this regard, truth commissions that 
lack the mandate for prosecution can be 
a necessary compromise, even if they fall 
far short of affecting the justice needed 
for reconciliation. Truth commissions 
have the potential of helping democratize 
civil-military relations, but it must be 
accepted that they are inherently an 
imperfect form of transitional justice that 
can nonetheless provide an important 
foundation for democratic reforms.
2. A LIMITED MANDATE
WITH PERVASIVE EFFECTS
No two truth commissions are the 
same. Commissions are a product of 
the societies that decide to go through 
with them and the past crimes that 
necessitate their undertaking. There 
have been over 40 truth commissions to 
date, with the majority of these coming 
in the twenty-fi rst century and the most 
recent commission, Brazil’s, released on 
December 10, 2014.
It is important to delineate these types 
of proceedings from other judicial 
proceedings. Priscilla B. Hayner’s 
defi nition of a truth commission will be 
used for the purpose of this article. She 
argues that a truth commission must meet 
fi ve basic parameters to distinguish itself 
from other judicial proceedings: 
“A truth commission is (1) focused on 
the past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took 
place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected 
populations, gathering information on 
their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, 
with the aim of concluding with a fi nal 
report; and (5) is offi cially authorized or 
empowered by the state for review”. [1]
Tellingly, this defi nition lacks any 
specifi c mention of security forces or 
civil-military relations. Even though 
truth commissions typically investigate 
the security institutions that perpetrated 
abuses, they are not specifi cally directed 
at ensuring any type of security sector 
reform. They will usually have a more 
limited mandate. However, by serving 
other purposes, these proceedings can 
infl uence civil-military relations. 
Primarily, it is the focus on a pattern 
of events that is pertinent to civil-
military relations. A pattern implies a 
relationship, and, in the case of truth 
commissions that come in the wake 
of a repressive regime, one of the key 
relationships that affect civil-military 
relations will be the relationship 
between the past government and the 
armed forces. It is this relationship that 
a new era of civil-military relations must 
be built upon. Revealing the intricacies 
of this past relationship that enabled 
abuses is a necessary step for ensuring 
the correct reforms are undertaken.  
Since these types of investigations are 
more aimed at fact-gathering, they tend to 
have more limited authorities than formal 
legal institutions and usually lack the 
authority to ensure the implementation 
of their recommendations or prosecute 
wrongdoers [2]. Although these limited 
authorities open truth commissions up to 
criticism, these same aspects also offer 
advantages over formal trials:
“One might think that this inability 
to punish would make commissions 
extremely unpopular. In fact, it has 
done just the opposite. After all, trials, 
the standard mechanism for arranging 
punishment, are a far from perfect way 
to establish transitional justice. The 
upper levels of the outgoing regime often 
demand immunity from prosecution as 
part of the transition deal. And even after 
repressive governments leave offi ce, 
their civil servants–including judges, 
prosecutors, and police–usually remain 
in place. This makes practical sense, 
since new democracies cannot afford to 
purge all their experienced technocrats, 
but it inevitably results in less vigorous 
investigation and punishment of old 
crimes. Trials, moreover, with their 
high standard of proof and extensive 
evidentiary requirements, are complicated 
and expensive, and fl edgling governments 
tend to be strapped for cash”. [3]
Since truth commissions lack the authority 
to prosecute or directly implement reforms, 
they can be expected to be met with more 
limited resistance by those who are targeted 
by these types of proceedings.
Despite more restricted legal powers, 
truth commissions’ broader mandate 
to identify the patterns and underlying 
causes that resulted in past abuses equips 
them to infl uence institutional reform. 
Commissions can focus on delineating 
state and institutional responsibility, rather 
than concentrating strictly on individual 
responsibility. It is this relationship to 
institutional responsibility and, in turn, 
institutional reforms that make truth 
commissions particularly relevant to the 
democratization of civil-military relations. 
3. A NECESSARY COMPROMISE
Commonly, a nation’s armed forces, or 
security forces in general, are the main 
perpetrators of the human rights abuses 
that a repressive regime relied upon 
to stay in power. During democratic 
transition, the new government’s 
relationship with the military will be 
a vital part of its ability to achieve 
democratic consolidation, which puts 
the newly formed, often struggling 
government in a precarious position. Its 
legitimacy may hinge on its ability to 
confront the state’s past, bring to justice 
those who committed past abuses, and 
address the grievances of victims. At the 
same time, the government will also be 
working to implement effective civilian 
control over the armed forces.  
The resistance of groups who were 
responsible for past abuses and their 
ability to continue to shape policy are 
two of the primary factors that determine 
a state’s transitional policies. Other 
factors include the organization of civil 
society groups calling for transitional 
justice, the nature and extent of past 
abuses, and international pressure [1]. If 
the armed forces are resistant to any type 
of prosecution — as can be expected if 
high-ranking members were responsible 
for past abuses — undertaking a 
truth commission may be a necessary 
compromise in order to take a step in the 
direction of reforming the security forces 
without creating a level of resistance that 
would make democratic progress unlikely. 
Truth commissions are the most likely 
compromise for the form of transitional 
justice adopted when both the public 
demand for justice and the military’s 
demand for impunity is strong [4]. 
If past abuses are left unaddressed, 
then the armed forces will continue 
to be equated with the institution 
that perpetrated these wrongdoings. 
This can severely limit the military’s 
prestige. More importantly, a resistance 
to acknowledging past abuses is typically 
related to a resistance to future reforms 
[5]. If the government cannot bring the 
military under effective civilian control, 
then they may instead try to limit the 
effectiveness of the armed force, which is 
only a viable option if there is no poignant 
threat that must be defended against.
Thus, fl edgling governments are faced 
with a serious challenge regarding 
civil-military relations and transitional 
justice. On one hand, if past abuses are 
left unaddressed, then the legitimacy of 
the new government will be in question 
and the armed forces will continue to 
be equated with the perpetrators of past 
abuses, severely affecting the society’s 
trust in the armed forces and willingness 
to grant the authorities necessary to carry 
out its responsibilities. On the other hand, if 
the government decides to go through with 
prosecution, then the government can expect 
to face signifi cant resistance from military 
leaders, which can inhibit the implementation 
of other democratic reforms. 
In the worst case scenario, the resistance 
of the military could be a destabilizing 
force for the new government. Under 
more benign conditions, the military’s 
resistance can limit the mandate of the 
type of transitional justice pursued, 
making them non-attributional, or it 
can necessitate compromise in other 
dimensions of civil-military relations. 
Since truth commissions do not have the 
same authority as domestic prosecution, 
they can be a less destabilizing choice 
for transitional justice, especially 
when military resistance is high and 
the military still possesses signifi cant 
political power [2]. 
Thus, truth commissions are typically 
a bargain between the public demand 
for justice and the entrenched interests 
of security forces, but they are a 
bargain that can nonetheless be an 
important fi rst step in the direction of 
the democratization of civil-military 
relations.  Although this is far from 
perfect justice, it refl ects the challenges 
transitional governments face [3]. 
Even under a more limited mandate, 
truth commissions can provide an 
important foundation for security sector 
reforms. Simply put, societies may be 
compelled to trade justice for truth. 
Perpetrators of past abuses may not 
face justice, but the acknowledgement 
of past abuses and the illumination of 
the underlying structural arrangement 
that enabled these crimes can be more 
effective in the long-run at preventing 
future abuses than holding accountable 
individual wrongdoers. Moreover, 
commissions can later provide evidence 
to courts or catalyze public support that 
will eventually lead to prosecution.
4. ACCOUNTABILITY
Truth commissions can have a variety 
of aims: “to discover, clarify, and 
formally acknowledge past abuses; to 
address the needs of victims; to “counter 
impunity“ and advance individual 
accountability; to outline institutional 
responsibility and recommend reforms; 
and to promote reconciliation and 
reduce confl ict over the past” [1].  
Although these goals are interrelated, 
the ones that apply most directly to 
civil-military relations are countering 
impunity, advancing accountability, 
outlining institutional responsibility, 
and recommending reforms to ensure 
that past abuses are not perpetuated. 
Countering impunity and advancing 
accountability both help restore 
the prestige of the armed forces by 
distinguishing individual perpetrators 
from the institutions themselves. 
Outlining institutional responsibility 
and recommending reforms are broader 
goals, which can provide the justifi cation 
for reforms that place greater civilian 
control over the armed forces.  
After a period of repression, society 
must once again learn to trust the security 
forces, many times the perpetrators of 
past abuses. If individuals within these 
institutions are not held accountable for 
past abuses, then the entire institution 
will continue to be equated with that of 
the past repressive regime.  
Just like the dynamic nature of truth 
commissions themselves, different 
societies must determine what holding 
individuals to account means. An 
important decision regarding the 
commission’s mandate will be whether 
or not to name names. For example, 
El Salvador’s and South Africa’s truth 
commissions named perpetrators; 
Guatemala’s and Chile’s did not [6]. 
Societies must also decide what to do 
with those connected with past abuses. 
In the case of Eastern Europe many 
states chose the broad and relatively 
indiscriminate strategy of “lustration”, 
where individuals were removed from 
public employment based strictly upon 
their prior political affi liation.  Other 
states have attempted more specifi c 
means of accountability, such as removing 
only those who were directly connected 
with a past record of human rights abuses 
[1]. Regardless of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two approaches, this 
type of individual accountability allows 
societies to draw a clear distinguishing 
line between wrongdoers themselves and 
the institutions they were a part of.
Truth commissions should not 
only bring to light which individuals 
committed human rights abuses but how 
they were able to use their institutions to 
do so. Beyond individual accountability, 
there is institutional accountability, 
which must be clearly addressed before 
the institutions can be reformed.  It is the 
focus on patterns, rather than individual 
wrongdoing, that make these proceedings 
particularly well-suited to identify the 
structural problems that enabled abuses 
and list the reforms needed to prevent the 
reoccurrence of human rights abuses [1]. 
Ensuring the prevention of future 
abuses is one of the primary goals of 
any type of transitional justice, and the 
reformation of security forces is inherent to 
this process. Truth commissions can prevent 
future abuses in a number of ways: 
“Powered with the knowledge of 
past systematic abuses, civil society 
can work against the return of abusive 
regimes. Additionally, [commissions] 
guarantee that perpetrators know that if 
they violate human rights it can become 
public knowledge. Furthermore, if a 
process of truth-seeking is followed by 
reform of state institutions ensuring 
transparency and accountability of 
the security forces, it can minimize the 
chances of such abuses reoccurring 
within the institutional framework – 
therefore remembrance is vital”. [2] 
Uncovering not only the individuals 
responsible for past abuses but also the 
conditions and relations between different 
institutions and civil society that enabled 
these abuses can lead to the necessary 
reforms that ensure these conditions are 
not perpetuated.  The title of Argentina’s 
truth commission report, Nunca Mas 
(Never Again), refl ects this intention [6].  
Many commissions have included 
recommendations specifi c to the armed 
forces. For example, the El Salvadoran 
commission recommended purging 
the military, the South African and 
Guatemalan commissions recommended 
ensuring effective civilian control 
over the armed forces and a change 
in military doctrine, and the Chilean 
commission recommended redefi ning 
the roles of the military and intelligence 
services. [6]. Even if it is decided not 
to implement the recommendations of 
a truth commission, the identifi cation 
of institutional responsibility can help 
garner the political will to push through 
necessary reforms later on.
5. WHERE THERE’S A WILL
While some truth commissions may 
have the underlying purpose of reforming 
institutions with records of abuses, most 
will have more specifi c aims, such as 
assisting victims’ families in the grieving 
process by bringing closure to cases 
of missing victims [1]. Even in the 
cases of these more modest goals, truth 
commissions can help lay the foundation 
for more robust reforms by helping the 
transitional government win the public 
support needed for future reforms.  
Many times, gaining the necessary 
political support will be the most diffi cult 
part of implementing reforms needed 
for the democratization of civil-military 
relations. A range of literature and 
experience demonstrates the structural 
reforms necessary for ensuring effective 
civilian control of the armed forces under a 
democratic government, from appointing 
a powerful civilian minister of defense 
to ensuring effective civilian budgetary 
control of armed forces to revamping 
military doctrine and professional 
education. Knowing what reforms are 
necessary is not as challenging as having 
the political will and capital to implement 
these reforms [7].
Elrin Mobekk refers to the way 
truth commissions can help garner the 
political will to push through reforms as 
a “mindset shift”:  
“A major problem in SSR [security 
sector reform] lies in the implementation 
of new laws, norms and values. It is 
therefore crucial to focus on the mindset 
shift. This is by far the most diffi cult task 
in any reform process. It is also what will 
take the longest time – changing minds 
towards an acceptance that reform will 
leave all actors better off is not achieved 
overnight, nor can this be enforced from 
the outside. There is an often un-stated 
understanding that this is the goal of the 
reform processes… transitional justice 
can start the process of a mindset shift 
in a post-confl ict society”. [2] 
The publicity of truth commissions, 
revelation of the graphic details of past 
abuses, and identifi cation of the patterns 
and practices that allowed these abuses 
can all help garner popular support for 
those parties calling for reforms in civil-
military relations and democratic transition 
in general. In particular, commissions 
can spark a public debate about the roles 
institutions played in enabling past abuses 
and how they can be reformed to prevent 
this in the future [5].
Thus, the effect of truth commissions 
on civil-military relations must be seen in 
their ability to make incremental progress, 
rather than their ability to solve a number 
of long-festering problems in one sweeping 
blow.  This incremental approach refl ects the 
process of democratic consolidation, which 
is almost always going to be one of prolonged 
change, rather than a quick transition [8].
6. A TIME FOR REFORM
The viability of an incremental 
approach also suggests the need for 
sequencing. The timing of the publication 
of a commission’s fi ndings and 
recommendations is critical to its ability 
to affect the democratization of civil-
military relations. For maximum effect, 
the commission’s recommendations 
should be published so that it along 
with security sector reforms already 
underway can reinforce each other. If 
the recommendations are published too 
early in the democratization process, 
then security forces will be able to block 
the implementation of the suggested 
reforms, while if the fi ndings are 
published too late in the reform process, 
they will be unnecessary [2].
Although the recommendations of 
commissions can lead to reforms, 
reforms not implemented can have an 
adverse effect.  Narcis Serra argues that 
a reform should not be announced if the 
means do not exist to implement it [8]. 
Unfortunately, this will almost always 
be the case with truth commissions. 
The lack of a means for enforcing 
recommended reforms is typical of 
commissions. The greater strength of 
security forces versus the new regime that 
necessitated a commissions undertaking 
in the fi rst place, as opposed to another 
form of transitional justice, can be 
used to block the implementation of 
recommended reforms. If these reforms 
are not implemented, then the result will 
likely be a pervasive disillusionment. 
These adverse effects must be accounted 
for and factored into the timing of the 
recommendations and they way they are 
crafted.  It should not stand in the way of 
a commission’s undertaking.
7. CONCLUSION
A number of conclusions can be 
drawn about truth commissions and 
civil-military relations.  First, truth 
commissions serve a variety of purposes 
so they should not be seen strictly through 
the lens of civil-military relations. 
However, even if truth commissions are 
not directed at civil-military relations 
they can have indirect or secondary 
effects that infl uence security sector 
reform. Second, many times truth 
commissions can have a broader impact 
than their specifi ed aims. Even if a truth 
commission does not accomplish the 
broader goal of institutional reform, its 
success in accomplishing other, more 
modest goals can lay the foundation for 
future progress. For example, fact-fi nding 
truth commissions specifi cally aimed at 
addressing the needs of victims can help 
develop the necessary evidence to be used 
if amnesty is eventually overturned or 
can provide the impetus for more robust 
changes later down the road. 
Finally, the effect of truth commissions 
on civil-military relations must be 
seen within the tumultuous process 
of democratization, not through the 
lens of a consolidated democracy. 
Commissions are not an alternative to 
more direct forms of prosecution and 
should not be perceived as such. When 
impunity is granted as a prerequisite 
to commissions, sacrifi cing justice 
for truth invites a lot of criticism, 
and this should not be necessary under 
a consolidated democracy. However, 
during the process of democratization, 
many competing interests must be 
reconciled as the country continues 
to slowly work towards democratic 
consolidation. Establishing individual 
and institutional accountability, even 
under a non-attributional mandate, can be 
a necessary and signifi cant step towards 
implementing the reforms that will help 
ensure a democratic security force.
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